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The 2016 elections were plagued by online disinformation campaigns 
and foreign meddling. In their wake, Internet platforms, like Facebook 
and Google, came under scrutiny to self-regulate or be regulated by the 
government. Over the past four years, these platforms have taken 
steps—some significant, some more smoke-and-mirrors—to reduce the 
threat of foreign meddling and disinformation in our political 
campaigns. They have done so voluntarily, but in the shadow of 
threats of regulation. 
 
Meanwhile, political messaging continues on social media. Online 
political speech is particularly useful to small campaigns, such as those 
at the state and local level, who are unable to afford to run television 
advertisements. These small campaigns can place ads online for mere 
pennies per view—or even for free. Foreclosing social media political 
advertising as an option for candidates and campaigns, as Twitter 
recently did, is probably an overcorrection that would fall especially 
hard on small campaigns.  
 
Many online political ads narrowly target audiences. The typical 
political ad on social media lacks audience information, which would 
enable others to target the same audience in order to run counter-
messaging, or counter-speech, to use the Supreme Court’s phrasing. 
This means that campaigns who may be spreading disinformation can 
do so without being challenged before the same audience. The lack of 
transparency for online ad buys is notable, especially when compared 
to ad buys for television and radio, which are disclosed publicly and 
make the target audience obvious. 
 
The problem is three-fold. First, there is some panic among the public 
about disinformation, which can weaken the perceived legitimacy of 
our elections. Second, the disinformation itself may undermine voters’ 
decision making. It is hard to know how effective the disinformation 
attacks of 2016 were, in part because Facebook has not shared data 
like it promised that it would. However, even if the 2016 attacks 
failed—and they might not have changed many minds—future attacks 
may succeed. Moreover, the public, after learning about the way 
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microtargeting works from movies and news specials,1 seems to be 
fairly concerned about political disinformation on social media. That 
concern may cause the public to have less trust in the outcomes of our 
elections, which is dangerous for our democracy. Therefore, it is 
important to erect safeguards now. 
 
The third aspect of the problem concerns regulatory symmetry. It is 
irrational for a system to provide loopholes that leave voters less able 
to learn about who is speaking to them on social media platforms 
compared to television and radio. Platforms have partly stepped in to 
close this gap, but they are unreliable self-regulators, as Former 
Federal Election Commission Chair Ann Ravel and I explain in other 
work.2 
 
Government cannot be the arbiter of truth; that would violate the First 
Amendment. However, it can demand transparency. Online political 
advertising transparency is best thought of as a democratic guardrail 
and an aid to accountability rather than a silver bullet that will solve 
our problem with disinformation and foreign meddling. This essay 
builds on arguments I have made elsewhere, primarily in Wood & 
Ravel (2018),3 in which we argued there that platforms should be 
required to make targeting criteria available. Here, I expand the 
proposal in order to be consistent with its underlying rationale: 
platforms should make both the targets (core audience) and the 
audience who saw the ad due to shares and likes (final audience), 





1 See, e.g., THE GREAT HACK (NETFLIX 2019); How Campaigns Use Big Data Tools 
to Microtarget Voters, CBS NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018),   
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/how-campaigns-use-big-data-tools-to-microtarget-
voters/ [https://perma.cc/LD56-2FVW]; Los Angeles Times, Here’s How Political 
Campaigns Can Target You Online, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRlb0R07UJY [https://perma.cc/5PMN-
YCYA]; VICE News, How Political Campaigns Use Data to Target Ads to Voters 
(HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZP3kLe_3uLo [https://perma.cc/Y7MV-U3Z4].    
2 Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and 
Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1223, 1244-46 (2018). 
3 See id.  




In Part II, I explain why accountability is important for paid online 
political speech. I also review what we know about disinformation, its 
incidence, and review social scientific findings concerning its effects. I 
conclude Part II by describing the two main types of online political 
advertising and the ways money is involved distributing it. Part III 
reviews our core First Amendment jurisprudence on political speech 
and discusses counter-speech as a remedy for political disinformation. 
Part IV demonstrates visually how much easier it is to hold speakers 
accountable and correct misinformation when the paid political speech 
occurs on broadcast and radio than when it occurs online. Part V 
presents my proposal that platforms who are profiting from paid 
political speech online should make the audiences of any paid political 
speech re-targetable by anyone who wants to speak to the same 
audience. While the incentives align such that they should simply 
agree to do this to increase profits and signal to the world that they 
care about democracy, it is also possible that the government could 
require this transparency from them. Lastly, Part VI discusses details 
and limitations of the proposal.  
 
One final note before proceeding: most of the examples in this essay 
concern Facebook, which is one of the two biggest platforms profiting 
from paid political speech online. Google is the other. Google is well 
on its way to solving the problems I discuss. Facebook is not, and so 
most of my examples are from Facebook. 
 
II. Accountability, Disinformation, and Counter-speech 
 
Political speakers are subject to less accountability online than they are 
in almost any other venue. The most relevant comparison to online 
advertising, which often features video and audio, is advertising on 
television and radio.4 There are three reasons to add more 





4 Advertising on cable TV can be narrowly targeted in some instances that are not 
worth explaining here, except to say that the cable-TV providers should be held to 
the same requirements that I propose here. The broad point is that the smaller the 
audience, the lower the accountability for the speech. 
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disinformation and foreign influence; (2) facilitate counter-speech; and 
(3) bring at least as much transparency to online political speech as we 
have for paid political speech on broadcast television and radio. In this 
Part, I explain how the lack of accountability emerges. I also discuss 
political disinformation as a potential problem, as well as other aspects 
of online advertising that might lead opposing campaigns to want to 
counter-speak to the same audiences. 
 
a. Online Advertising and Accountability 
 
Regulatory gaps and technological innovations, like micro-targeting, 
create the opportunity for reduced accountability online. Campaign 
finance transparency can increase accountability for campaign 
advertising. I take each of these issues in turn. 
 
Reduced accountability and narrow audiences 
 
In this age of polarization, voter mobilization is particularly important. 
Moreover, we know that narrow targeting can be effective in 
competitive races.5 To that end, as elections approach, most campaigns 
and related groups making political expenditures (I will refer to them 
all as “campaigns” for simplicity) will focus almost entirely on 
mobilizing the people they perceive to be likely voters.  
 
How do campaigns find likely voters? First, they use internal data on 
who they think will turn out to vote for their candidate or issue, based 
on the voter file and surveys they’ve conducted. Second, campaigns 
purchase data from firms who have internal “likely voter models,” 
based on a proprietary mix of past turnout, demographic, and other 





5 See Katherine Haenschen & Jay Jennings, Mobilizing Millennial Voters with 
Targeted Internet Advertisements: A Field Experiment, 36 POL. COMM. 357 (2019).  
6 Cambridge Analytica may be the most well-known of these firms among the public 
mind, but they are a relative newcomer to the world of campaign analytics. For a 
deep dive into the way campaigns use data from Catalist, a data vendor that supports 
progressive campaigns, see David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political 
Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 51 (2014).  The firms’ data is better 
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on data that the platforms acquired about the users, though targeting 
possibilities vary across platforms.7 This means that political 
advertisements can be targeted using the platforms’ information about 
their users, or by using a list of targets generated by the campaign with 
data from outside of the platform. The novel strategy allowed with 
online advertisements, which is not possible with broadcast TV and 
radio advertising, is narrow targeting. 
 
Narrow targeting, however, introduces accountability problems. When 
audiences are small and like-minded, speakers are less likely to be held 
accountable for their speech. Take, for example, “locker room talk.” 
President Trump and his surrogates dismissed his infamous “grab them 
by the pussy” remark as “locker room talk.”8 Locker room talk is 
boastful and private, and importantly, it goes unchallenged by the 
hearers, never leaving the all-male “safe space” of the locker room. In 
other words, it is speech to a small group that one is not held 
accountable for. Narrow targeting to like-minded audiences is similar 
to engaging in locker room talk—it is speaking to voters who may not 
hold the campaign accountable. 
 
What do we know about how campaign messaging changes when 
accountability is reduced? An analogy to the dark money context may 
be instructive. Dark money groups do not disclose the sources of their 
money, so their political speech is anonymous. A recent study shows 
that “dark money” ads on TV are more likely to be negative than fully-
 
for voters who are the parties’ base, or the likely voters. See generally, EITAN 
HERSH, HACKING THE ELECTORATE (2015). 
7 Google has recently restricted microtargeting to broad categories of gender, race, 
age, and location. See CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. & PUB. LIFE, PLATFORM POLITICAL 
ADVERTISING POLICIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2020), 
https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Political-Advertising-
Policies-1.pdf. 
8 Pamela Engel, Anderson Cooper Confronts Donald Trump over Lewd Comments, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2016, 9:36 P.M.), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
clinton-debate-anderson-cooper-2005-comments-women-2016-10 
[https://perma.cc/2WQB-8CSC].    
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disclosed outside ads.9 People speaking without the threat of 
accountability are simply more likely to be nasty. 
 
It does not require a large logical leap to conclude that ads in another 
low-accountability setting, that of narrowly-targeted online political 
communications, may also be more negative, compared to broadly-
targeted ads. They also may be more extreme, for example, triggering 
fear or anger among the targeted voters, in an effort to mobilize them 
to vote. However, narrowly-targeting political speech online is not 
necessarily a safe haven for campaigns hoping to mobilize their base 
without accountability. Online speech can have enormous reach, and 
accountability for online speech can begin when someone clicks 
“share” on the ad. Therefore, even narrowly-targeted ads may expose 
the speaker to accountability if the targeting is inaccurate10 or the 
content is shared by the targets. 
 
As a descriptive matter, we are still learning about the ways in which 
narrowly-targeted ads may differ from broad-based appeals.11 My 
ongoing research with Shomik Jain suggests that, especially among 
political ads run by outside groups, narrowly-targeted ads on Facebook 
are more negative than ads targeted more broadly, and that online ads 





9 Daniel E. Chand, “Dark Money” and “Dirty Politics”: Are Anonymous Ads More 
Negative?, 19 BUS. & POL. 454 (2017).  
10 Erroneously targeted voters respond very poorly to seeing ads intended for other 
people. Eitan D. Hersh & Brian F. Schaffner, Targeted Campaign Appeals and the 
Value of Ambiguity, 75 J. POL. 520, 521 (2013) (“[V]oters who receive a message 
targeted to a group of which they are not a member consistently penalize the 
candidate for ‘mistargeting.’’’). 
11 Jessica Baldwin-Philippi reminds us that the most effective use of micro-targeting 
may be for A/B testing messages and for fundraising appeals. She also reviews the 
literature on what we know about the effectiveness of micro-targeting. See Jessica 
Baldwin-Phillipi, Data Campaigning: Between Empirics and Assumptions, 8 
INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1 (2019).  
12 While outside groups run most of the ads on Facebook, campaigns and parties also 
run ads on the platform, and their microtargeted ads tend to be more positive than 
their broadly-targeted ads. Shomik Jain &Abby K. Wood, Analyzing the Sentiment 
and Targeting of Political Advertisements on Facebook (2020) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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studies comparing social media ads, where narrow targeting is possible 
(if not always pursued), and television ads, which are necessarily 
broad-based. Studies making this comparison provide conflicting 
evidence on campaigns’ strategies. One recent study suggests that 
campaigns may not pursue different advertising strategies in the two 
venues.13 Another finds that Facebook ads are more partisan and more 
ideologically polarized than television ads, but that they engage in less 
attacking of the opponent candidates. The authors conclude, 
“[c]andidates do appear to take advantage of finer targeting to deliver 
more partisan messaging, which suggests that the capabilities of social 
media push candidates toward using ads more for mobilization than for 
persuasion.”14 In sum, the existing research is at least suggestive that 
narrowly-targeted ads differ from more broadly-targeted ads. The 
ways they differ – in tone and partisanship – may be important to 
voters. 
 
Mechanisms of accountability from campaign finance transparency 
 
Accountability for political speech is facilitated by transparency and 
created by two groups, in two time periods. In “real time” (more or 
less), the media, watchdog groups, and opposition campaigns act to 
hold speakers accountable. They use the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) disclosures, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
political file, on-ad disclaimers, and, to the extent they can, the 
platforms’ online ad archives to inform voters about the sources and 
destinations of campaign money. Here, accountability can come from 
voter reactions to the information. For example, if someone is a “big 
oil” candidate or “wine cave fundraiser” candidate, or if they have 
dark money support (discussed in the next subsection), voters can 






13 See generally Michael M. Franz et al., The Issue Focus of Online and Television 
Advertising in the 2016 Presidential Campaign, 48 AM. POL. RES. 175 (2020).  
14 Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising Online and Offline (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 3), 
https://web.stanford.edu/~gjmartin/papers/Ads_Online_and_Offline_Working.pdf.  
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Watchdog groups like Campaign Legal Center or Common Cause also 
push for accountability in real time. Their lawyers follow up on ads 
and disclosures that seem to violate campaign finance rules, and they 
file complaints with campaign finance regulators.15 The groups then 
engage in a campaign of press releases and social media to amplify 
their complaints. Attentive members of the public can use the 
information to decide how much to support a candidate that seems to 
be in violation of the rules.16 
 
On a slower time frame, regulators can use complaints, investigations, 
and disclaimer and disclosure information to hold speakers—including 
foreign speakers—accountable for other aspects of their campaign 
financing, though generally not for disinformation itself. At the federal 
level, this process can be extremely slow, because the FEC holds 
multiple votes to allow the investigation and subsequent enforcement 
action to proceed. For example, a SuperPAC supporting Jeb Bush 
accepted an illegal foreign contribution in 2015, but the group did not 
pay a fine until the case was finalized four years later in 2019.17 
 
b. What We Know About the Public, Disinformation, and 
Campaign Finance Transparency 
 
Social scientists, including myself, have been studying campaign 
finance transparency through an empirical lens. I described some of 
our studies of the advertising itself above. Now I briefly summarize 






15 Brendan Fischer & Maggie Christ, The Real Backstory to the Arrest of Two 
Ukrainian-American Trump Donors, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://campaignlegal.org/update/real-backstory-arrest-two-ukrainian-american-
trump-donors [https://perma.cc/3VQC-XHSL]. 
16 Abby K. Wood & Christian R. Grose, Campaign Finance Transparency Affects 
Legislators’ Election Outcomes and Behavior (Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Research 
Paper No. CLASS18-23, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236939.    
17 Letter from Mark D. Shonkwiler, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Election Comm., to 
J. Gerald Herbert (Mar. 8, 2019) https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2019-
03/FEC%20Conciliation%20Agreement.pdf. 
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The public wants—and rewards—transparency 
 
My own ongoing research suggests that the public wants transparent 
campaign financing. In an ongoing research project, I presented 1490 
voting-aged respondents with two hypothetical profiles for candidates 
in a party primary for state senate. The profiles included policy 
positions, campaign skills (e.g., persuasiveness in public, amount of 
money raised), and campaign finance facts (e.g., relationship to dark 
money groups, campaign finance compliance). Respondents across the 
ideological spectrum preferred the more transparent candidates to the 
less transparent candidates.18 This finding has been replicated and 
extended in other work that included party cues—candidates from 
opposite parties running against each other. As one might expect, 
where party information is included, the effect of transparency is 
slightly muted but still statistically significant.19  
 
Disinformation and the public imagination  
 
Generally speaking, disinformation is politically-motivated messaging 
“designed explicitly to engender public cynicism, uncertainty, apathy, 
distrust, and paranoia, all of which disincentivize citizen engagement 
and mobilization for social or political change.”20 We know that plenty 
of disinformation circulated online in advance of the 2016 presidential 
election and that some circulated in 2018 as well. However, the 
platforms have not made the entire corpus of data available to scholars 
who might help the public understand whether it was a common 
occurrence, a deeply harmful attack, or whether it was both harmful 






18 See Abby K. Wood, Show Me the Money: Candidate Selection Based on 
Campaign Finance Transparency (Ctr. for L. & Soc. Sci., Paper No. CLASS17-24, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029095. 
19 See Samuel C. Rhodes et al., The Role of Dark Money Disclosure on Candidate 
Evaluations and Viability, 18 ELECTION L.J. 175, 184 (2019).  
20 Dean Jackson, Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, 
and “Fake News”, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (Oct. 17. 2017), 
https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-distinguishing-disinformation-from-propaganda-
misinformation-and-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/HHY5-BXPF]. 
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The highest estimate in the public discourse is that disinformation was 
viewed approximately 100 million times,21 but without the 
denominator of how many political advertising impressions were 
generated during the campaign—a number that must be in the 
billions—we cannot know the rate of disinformation. Put another way, 
we do not know how common it was for the average social media user 
to see political disinformation in her social media feeds. A recent study 
suggests that sharing disinformation during the 2016 election was a 
relatively rare activity. In a survey on a representative sample of 1331 
respondents with linked Facebook profile data, scholars verified that 
8.5% of respondents shared links from websites known to be so-called 
“fake news” sites.22 Almost all of the people sharing the disinformation 
described themselves as “conservative” or “extremely conservative,” 
and most were over the age of 65.23 Patterns were similar on Twitter in 
the lead-up to the 2016 election. Almost 6% of “news” consumption 
was from fake news sites. But only 1% of users were exposed to 80% 
of fake news, and only 0.1% of users were responsible for sharing 80% 
of fake news. Voters in swing states did have a “slightly higher” rate 
of exposure than voters not in swing states.24 
 
One of the key strategies used by propagandists is to make us 





21 Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Hearing Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) (statement of Sen. Richard 
Burr, Chair, Sen. Intelligence Comm.); Craig Timberg, Russian Propaganda May 
Have Been Shared Hundreds of Millions of Times, New Research Says, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/10/05/russian-propaganda-may-have-been-shared-hundreds-of-
millions-of-times-new-research-says [https://perma.cc/J662-P25X] (citing Jonathan 
Albright, Itemized Posts and Historical Engagement —6 Now-Closed FB Pages, 
TABLEAU (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://public.tableau.com/profile/d1gi#!/vizhome/FB4/TotalReachbyPage 
[https://perma.cc/TJ38-U4WY] ).  
22 Andrew Guess et al., Less Than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake 
News Dissemination on Facebook, 5 SCI. ADVANCES, 1 (2019).  
23 Id.   
24 Nir Grinberg et al., Fake News on Twitter During the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election, 363 SCI. 374, 375 (2019).  
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and exhausting.25 The more that political speech can push or amplify 
disinformation, the more likely it is that the media will pick up the 
story, even if only to correct it. Steve Bannon, former political advisor 
to President Trump described this strategy as “flood[ing] the zone with 
shit.”26 To the extent that misinformation and disinformation have any 
lasting effect, we do know that they can be “sticky,” because we tend 
to accept familiar information as true. When the media picks up a story 
about disinformation, it may have the adverse effect of causing us to 
believe it, incorrectly remembering it as true, solely due to the 
repetition of the information.27 
 
What about the size of the effect? The public suspects that 
disinformation may have some effects, such as suppressing the vote or 
exacerbating polarization. However, these effects may be quite small 
or may not last long. Moreover, they are difficult to pinpoint, for lack 
of a valid counterfactual. How can we establish that someone would 





25 See Jason Stanley, In Defense of Truth, and the Threat of Disinformation, in CAN 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SURVIVE THE INTERNET? BOTS, ECHO CHAMBERS, AND 
DISINFORMATION 71 (Shawn Powers & Markos Kounalakis eds., 2017). 
26 David Remnick, Trump vs. the Times: Inside an Off-the-Record Meeting, NEW 
YORKER (July 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-vs-
the-times-inside-an-off-the-record-meeting [https://perma.cc/A9MU-8VV4]. 
27 David M.J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, 359 SCI. 1094, 1095 (2018) 
(citing Briony Swire et al., The Role of Familiarity in Correcting Inaccurate 
Information, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1948 (2017); Ullrich K.H. Ecker et al., 
Reminders and Repetition of Misinformation: Helping or Hindering Its Retraction?, 
6 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 185, 190 (2017)). Of course, not all 
propagandists are U.S. citizens. Transparency for online political speech should deter 
(or expose) at least some foreign influence in our campaigns. The indictments of Lev 
Parnas and Igor Fruman for laundering foreign money into our campaigns were 
enabled by a lawyer’s clever investigation into political spending that was disclosed 
pursuant to our transparency requirements for political giving. A lawyer at Campaign 
Legal Center matched addresses required by disclosures in order to flag the 
transactions as suspicious. 
28 Without getting too technical, I can imagine a scenario in which we could 
construct valid counterfactuals. Suppose disinformation attacks targeted very narrow 
geographic areas—precincts or zip codes. We can imagine matching targeted areas 
with areas nearby with similar demographic makeup that were not targeted, and 
looking at the difference in turnout rate. But disinformation attacks are probably not 
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still lack scholarly findings measuring individual effects of online 
political disinformation and misinformation, especially around the 
2016 election.29 A recent paper examining the effects of interaction 
with Russian bots on Twitter prior to the 2018 election finds no change 
in political attitudes before and after contact with bots.30 The authors 
suggest that the bots may have been targeting people who were already 
quite polarized and thus harder to persuade.31 Again, Facebook has not 
made data available to analyze the effects on its platform. Facebook is 
much larger and different than Twitter in many ways, including the 
age distribution of users of the people who use it.32 So these results 
using Twitter data may or may not generalize to the Facebook context. 
 
While it is true that people remember disinformation more than 
corrections,33 corrections are not altogether ineffective. Moreover, it is 
likely that most counter-speech will not consist of corrections to 
intentional disinformation. Rather, it will speak to the same audience, 
taking a different side of an issue.34  
 
so narrowly targeted—we cannot know because the platforms don’t release targeting 
criteria, and they are shared widely in a way that might cause us to under-state the 
size of the effect.  
29 Joshua A. Tucker et al., Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political 
Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature, HEWLETT FOUND. 1, 54 (Mar. 
2018), https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Social-Media-Political-
Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-Literature-Review.pdf.  
30 See Christopher A. Bail et al., Assessing the Russian Internet Research Agency’s 
Impact on the Political Attitudes and Behaviors of American Twitter Users in Late 
2017, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 243 (2020). 
31 Id. at 244.  
32 Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, 




33 See Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected 
Misinformation, 33 POL. COMM. 460, 462 (2015). 
34 What’s more, the nature of the corrective message matters. Political 
communications scholars have written extensively about correcting disinformation. 
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hochschild & Katherine Levine Einstein, Do Facts Matter? 
Information and Misinformation in American Politics, 130 POL. SCI. Q. 585 (2015); 
James H. Kuklinski et al., Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic 
Citizenship, 62 J. POL. 791, 805 (2000); Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When 




Still, voters are worried about online disinformation. An October 2018 
survey by the Brookings Institute revealed that 45% of respondents 
believed that “fake news is very much a threat to democracy.”35 
Similarly, 50% of respondents to a Pew survey said that “made up 
news” is a “very big problem for the country.”36 By way of 
comparison, that is more than the number of respondents who thought 
terrorism (34%) or racism (40%) is a very big problem.37 Accordingly, 
public concern about disinformation may be demobilizing and 
damaging even if disinformation itself is not, or even if it is very 
damaging but is also very rare. Therefore, it is important for the 
platforms to reduce disinformation in straightforward and reasonable 
ways. 
 
c. Why Counter-speech as the Solution? 
 
In light of the accountability gaps and the empirical reality of online 
political disinformation described so far, I introduce the general 
contours of my proposal forcing platforms to facilitate counter-speech 
in order to help the public hold bad actors accountable. Regulations 
requiring platforms to publish the audiences of advertisements on their 
platforms will also ameliorate an asymmetry in the regulations that 
exist in our campaign finance system. One appeal of this push for 
counter-speech is its pragmatism, particularly in light of decades of 
Supreme Court opinions upholding disclosure requirements but 




Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEH. 303, 
311-22 (2010).  
35 Darrell M. West, Brookings Survey Finds 57 Percent Say They Have Seen Fake 
News During 2018 Elections, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Oct. 23, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/10/23/brookings-survey-finds-57-
percent-say-they-have-seen-fake-news-during-2018-elections-and-19-percent-
believe-it-has-influenced-their-vote/ [https://perma.cc/T8BL-97VQ].  
36 Michael Dimock, An Update On Our Research Into Trust, Facts and Democracy, 
Pew Res. Ctr. (June 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/2019/06/05/an-update-
on-our-research-into-trust-facts-and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/RB6J-UW4A]. 
37 Id.  




Opposing sides in ideological or partisan battles sometimes aim to 
mobilize (turn out voters likely to support you), and sometimes they 
aim to persuade voters who are torn between two or more candidates 
to vote for their side. The distinction between mobilization and 
persuasion audiences in party primaries or local elections is probably 
fairly minimal; campaigns often speak to overlapping groups of people 
in these election campaigns. In general elections, mobilization 
audiences probably do not overlap much between the two sides. 
However, their persuasion audiences may overlap as they each try to 
locate the median voter. The point is that even without disinformation, 
electoral competitors sometimes want to reach the same audiences. As 
I discuss below, reaching your competitor’s audience is exceedingly 
simple on broadcast television and radio. By contrast, when 
advertising moves online, reaching your competitors’ audience ranges 
from possible if not simple (on Google) to impossible (on Facebook). 
The platforms could allow campaigns to reach their competitors' 
audiences, and the government could require platforms to do so. As of 
this writing in April 2020, only Google comes close to actually 
facilitating counter-speech, and they did so voluntarily. 
 
Why allow counter-speech in the absence of outright lies? Because 
careful editing and hyperbole can push the line between truth and lies 
so much that campaigns may want to respond to opposing sides’ 
advertising. For example, anger is particularly motivating for voters.38 
As a result, turnout-oriented messages often give rise to anger in 
viewers.39 For example, in October 2018, the Trump campaign ran ads 
about a supposed caravan of (asylum-seeking) migrants trying to enter 





38 Christopher Weber, Emotions, Campaigns, and Political Participation, 66 POL. 
RES. Q. 414, fig.2 (2013). Steve Bannon agrees: “We got elected on Drain the 
Swamp, Lock Her Up, Build a Wall. . .. This was pure anger. Anger and fear is what 
gets people to the polls[.]” Remnick, supra note 26.  
39 Weber, supra note 38, at fig.2.  
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was obviously not an invasion of the United States. Is this a lie? Oh, 
who knows. Neither the government nor the platforms want to be 
involved in these line-drawing exercises. Adopting a blanket rule 
requiring platforms to facilitate counter-speech means they do not 
have to. 
 
When such fear—or anger—inspiring ads run, many groups may want 
to respond to correct disinformation (or misinformation) or to 
neutralize anger. In our example, refugee-supporting groups or 
immigration advocates may want to run ads presenting factual 
information about the challenges of living safely in certain Central 
American countries or about the relative crime rates between 
undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens. Under the current setup, 
these groups would face two challenges. The most important challenge 
for this subsection is that they have to be aware that the ad ran at all. 
For instance, suppose that only people who “like” or “follow” a white 
supremacist Facebook Page receive an advertisement that contains 
disinformation. It’s highly unlikely that the people who receive the ad 
will “blow the whistle” on it by publicizing it. This is for two reasons: 
(1) they may believe the disinformation contained in it, and (2) they 
are likely to agree with it. Google and Facebook’s searchable ad 
archives for paid content have minimally solved this problem by 
posting the advertisement for all to see.41 
 
The second challenge that groups hoping to counter-speak face is 
knowing who saw the ad—who they should “counter-speak” to. I 
return to both challenges in Part III of this essay. 
 
Bring online political advertising in line with broadcast TV/radio. 
 
Under the current system, online political advertisers are subject to 
less regulation than political advertising on broadcast TV and radio. 
The regulations and jurisprudence on campaign finance disclosure has 
 
(“We have an INVASION! So we are BUILDING THE WALL to STOP IT. Dems 
will sue us. But we want a SAFE COUNTRY!”). 
41 Awareness of organic content that circulates online is a different and more 
challenging problem. See discussion infra Part III. 
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enabled these regulatory disparities by narrowly defining terms such as 
“political communication,” which only cover “political 
communications placed for a fee on the website of another”; and so-
called “electioneering communications,” which are defined so as to not 
include internet communications. The net result, as explained in prior 
work,42 is to exempt online political ads from many transparency 
requirements that identical ads would be subject to, if they aired on 
television, rather than online. 
 
This state of affairs makes no sense, of course. Even when ads posted 
online are identical in content to those posted on broadcast and radio, 
they are capable of reaching many more people than ads run on TV 
and radio. Online ads can stay online indefinitely, and once posted, 
they can be retweeted and shared. Thus, at a minimum, ads that air in 
one venue should be subject to the same transparency requirements as 
ads that run on other venues, like broadcast and radio. 
 
First Amendment Pragmatism 
 
Finally, accountability for online speech may be the only real tool 
available for those hoping for more aggressive campaign finance 
regulation. For over 40 years, regulation of campaign expenditures 
have been subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.43 Even 
if the courts should de-constitutionalize their scrutiny of disclosure 
regulations,44 they have not. Still, disclosure policies are scrutinized 
with a slightly lower—and mushier—level of scrutiny than bans and 
limits. Disclosure laws are more likely to survive the “exacting 
scrutiny” they receive than bans and limits on campaign financing, 
which receive strict scrutiny.   
 






42 Wood & Ravel, supra note 2, at 1248-53.  
43 E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) “constitutionalized” speech. 
44 Michael S. Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1700, 1721 (2013). 
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Before moving on, it’s important to establish a factual baseline. For 
our purposes, there are two kinds of online political speech: (1) 
organic content (most is unpaid) and (2) paid content.  
 
Organic political content is content typically placed for free on social 
media sites. It may be placed on a campaign’s or group’s Facebook 
Page or Twitter feed. From there, it can be shared by followers, which 
can result in more followers for the campaign or group, increasing the 
reach and impact of future communications. Organic political content 
may also be created by someone not affiliated with the campaign or 
group and shared by the the group or campaign with their social media 
followers. 
 
Paid political content is placed online by campaigns who pay to place 
the ads. Social media platforms display ads in their users’ feeds for a 
certain price per view or per click. Campaigns may also place the ads 
on their own Pages and “boost” the ads into their followers’ feeds. 
Google places ads in search results or on websites.  
 
The proposal advanced here will most easily apply to paid content, 
which is easiest for the platforms to capture and make transparent. 
However, organic content is not necessarily cost-free, even when it is 
placed for free. A lot of organic content is supported by payments, 
either in production or distribution. Production costs include all of the 
costs of making videos (writers, lighting, makeup, videography, 
scriptwriting, editing, production assistants, renting spaces to film, 
etc.), or paying graphic designers to make still ads look great. Off-
platform distribution costs for organic content involve paying for 
shares, likes, or retweets from so-called “bots.” Although this behavior 
violates the platforms’ terms of service, the platforms rarely penalize 
users for these violations, and it therefore remains a common 
practice.45 Similarly, Michael Bloomberg’s campaign blurred the line 
between the paid and “organic” content by paying “influencers” to 





45 See generally Lutz Finger, Do Evil—The Business of Social Media, FORBES (Feb. 
17, 2015, 9:41 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lutzfinger/2015/02/17/do-evil-
the-business-of-social-media-bots/#6de157cbfb58 [https://perma.cc/ZE3G-SDT7]. 
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previously prohibited by Facebook, but they changed their rules, 
seemingly to accommodate his campaign.  
 
III. Counter-speech and the First Amendment 
 
As explained above, political disinformation may not cause as much 
damage as the media coverage suggests. But, however frequent or 
damaging political disinformation is, its harms46 should be addressed 
by government. Whatever else the First Amendment might allow, a 
remedy that allows (but does not force) more speech should survive 
scrutiny. The platforms must facilitate speakers in accomplishing the 
remedy. In this section, I review the relevant First Amendment 
jurisprudence about political disinformation and transparency. I also 
briefly discuss why the general regulation I propose is likely to survive 
constitutional scrutiny. 
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted our First Amendment to protect 
political speech, even where it is false. In general, the Court requires a 
heightened showing—falsity and actual malice—for a public official47 
or public figure48 to establish a prima facie defamation case against 
someone who utters lies against them. This high bar protects citizens’ 
ability to speak out against the government, core to our First 
Amendment freedoms. Hyperbole and “rhetorical flourish” are not 
enough to support a defamation suit brought by a public official.49 In 
addition to how hard it is to bring a defamation or libel suit, a remedy 
through the courts would also be too slow for the fast-paced and 
deadline-driven world of political campaigns. Political damage 





46 The Court may undervalue the harm caused by speech—especially when it is 
hateful. Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 953, 965 (2016). The political advertising I’m writing about here would only 
rarely cross the line to true hate speech. At its worst, the divisive and disinformative 
speech we know most about from 2016 contained racist and anti-Semitic dog 
whistles. 
47 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
48 Curtis Publ’g Co v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65 (1967).  
49 E.g., Greenbelt Co-op. Pub Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970). 
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Defamation suits are therefore disfavored as a solution to online 
political disinformation. 
 
The Court’s most recent statement on disinformation is U.S. v. 
Alvarez, in which the defendant lied about having received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.50 His claim violated the Stolen Valor 
Act, a content-based restriction on speech that made it a misdemeanor 
for someone to falsely claim they received any U.S. military 
decoration or medal. The Court struck down the statute as violating the 
First Amendment and concluded that falsity alone may not be enough 
to exclude speech from constitutional protection. The Court then 
reasoned,  
 
The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true . . . . 
The theory of the Constitution is “that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.” The First Amendment itself 
ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like, and for 
good reason.51 
 
The Alvarez opinion suggests that the Court will not tolerate 
government intervention when false information concerns an 
individual’s character or achievements, such as military decorations. 
But the court may allow government regulations prohibiting 
disinformation about the election process itself to survive. In 
Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, the Court overturned a 





50 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
51 Id. at 727-28 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). Alvarez draws upon a Brandeis concurrence from 1927 in Whitney v. 
California, in which the Court upheld the application of the Syndicalism Act, a 
criminal law, against a woman who joined the Communist Labor Party, which the 
majority perceived to present a threat of violent government overthrow. Alvarez, 567 
U.S. at 727. In his concurrence, Brandeis said “[i]f there be time to expose through 
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, 
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency 
can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with 
freedom.” Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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overbroad. In a footnote, the majority noted that “[w]e do not doubt 
that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about 
voting requirements and procedures.”52 This exception probably proves 
the rule. Legislative or regulatory bans on political disinformation 
relating to the logistics of voting itself stand the best chance of 
surviving scrutiny. But with other political disinformation, the Court is 
unlikely to view bans as acceptable under the First Amendment. That 
leaves transparency requirements and counter-speech as the best 
regulatory response. 
 
This idea of counter-speech as the remedy for false political speech is 
still fairly under-developed in the jurisprudence. For example, it is 
unclear who the Court thinks should counter-speak or hear the counter-
speech, when the counter-speech must be allowed to occur, or whether 
it must be facilitated by an entity profiting from the false speech. In 
U.S. v. Alvarez, the counter-speech that satisfied the Court’s majority 
was conducted by the media in calling out Alvarez’s lies.53 The injured 
parties in Alvarez were presumably recipients of the Congressional 
Medal of Honor, but the facts of the case do not indicate that they had 
engaged in counter-speech against Alvarez’s lies.54 In the context of 
online disinformation, the injured parties are the campaigns and 
candidates about whom the disinformation is spread and the voters 
who are trying to make up their minds about which candidates and 
issues to support. The “stolen valor” issue in Alvarez was not time-





52 Minn. Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 n.4 (2018). 
53 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726-27. 
54 In Whitney v. California, Brandeis seems to believe that government efforts to 
educate voters about the relative merits of capitalism versus communism was 
important for counter-speech. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 364. He is not clear 
on who the injured party is, though it is presumably the incumbent government. 
Importantly, Whitney v. California is not a disinformation case. See Whitney, 274 
U.S. at 357. However, in New York Times v. Sullivan, which is a disinformation case, 
the injured party is Sullivan, a public official in Alabama about whom the NAACP 
ran an ad that contained three inaccuracies. The primary injured party in that case 
was the public official, who sued for defamation, though the voters seeking to 
determine who to vote for in the next election may also have been injured. The New 
York Times v. Sullivan court does not discuss counter-speech. See New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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practically ineffective and irrelevant, as is the case in the campaign 
context. Finally, no entity profited from publishing Alvarez’s lies, 
whereas in the context of online political disinformation, the platforms 
profit from its publication. 
 
Counter-speech as a remedy for disinformation fits well in the court’s 
“marketplace of ideas” theory of the First Amendment. Content neutral 
regulations that foster more political speech, like the one proposed 
here, enhance the marketplace of ideas. Nevertheless, the regulation 
might be challenged under the First Amendment in two ways, neither 
of which is likely to succeed.55   
 
First, challengers could claim that requiring platforms to allow re-
targeting of audiences subsidizes political speech by counter-speakers. 
They may argue that anyone wanting to counter-speak can free-ride on 
the first speakers’ targeting list, which the first speaker may have paid 
a consultant to compile. This argument would rely on a broad reading 
of Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett,56 a 2011 Supreme Court 
opinion ruling that part of Arizona’s public financing law violates the 
First Amendment. That law provided additional funds to publicly-
funded candidates who faced spending that exceeded the limits that the 
publicly-funded candidates voluntarily agreed to in order to qualify for 
the program. That provision could have resulted in situations that 
benefitted the publicly-funded candidates in ways that were not 
triggered by the actions of the privately-funded candidate. The five-
justice majority ruled that this system burdened the speech of 
privately-funded candidates. They seemed particularly troubled by the 
“multiplier effect” of fundraising by a privately-funded candidate 
triggering almost equal support to all publicly-funded candidates for 
the same seat, as well as the fact that independent groups could trigger 
the matching funds to go to the publicly-funded candidates. The court 
described the privately-funded candidate’s choice as “trigger matching 






55 I address policy objections and counterarguments in Part V, infra. 
56 Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). 
57 Id. at 2810. 
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Here, the context differs enough that the government could 
successfully distinguish a requirement to facilitate counter speech from 
the public financing “subsidy” in Arizona Free Enterprise. In Arizona 
Free Enterprise, the nature of the subsidy was campaign money paid 
directly to opponents.  Here, it is not a financial subsidy at all, but a 
limited information subsidy, in which the counter-speaker can 
disseminate information but receives almost no information. 58  The 
first speakers will be targeting either “persuadables” – voters who are 
still undecided between two or more candidates – or base voters, who 
are unlikely to be swayed by counter speech. Campaign consultants 
have much more accurate data about base voters and so they focus 
much more energy on turning them out than on contacting 
persuadables.59  Counter-speakers who are candidates would find the 
electoral return on contacting base voters to be very small. 
Importantly, as I explain in Part V, counter-speakers would not know 
who they were speaking to or why the first-speaker chose them. All a 
counter speaker could do under my proposal is choose to target an 
audience, based on whether she wants to respond to an ad placed by 
her opponent.  So the benefit to the candidate is merely in being able 
to speak to the same audience. If she happens to be contacting 
persuadables – and remember, consultants have a hard time finding 
them – the subsidy is slightly higher because she may be able to sway 
them.  
 
Of course, not all counter-speakers would be involved in elections. 
Recall the caravan / “invasion” example above. Advocates for Central 
American immigrants may also want to counter-speak to the audience 
reached by President Trump’s advertisement. Their motivation for 
counter-speech may not be electoral, but instead to protect their clients 
from hate crimes and other harassment from the audiences of ads that 
demonize their community. These advocates and groups would be 





58 The first speaker knows the identities of the audience and can contact them in a 
variety of ways (phone, text, mailers, email, etc.) – a much higher value than the 
counter speaker receives from the ability to contact the same audience. That does not 
change the fact that the counter-speaker can “free ride” in this narrow sense of 
contacting the same audience, as if the ad were run on broadcast television. 
59 See HERSH, supra n. 10. 
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paid a consultant for the list is particularly irrelevant in this contact, 
since it would not result in an electoral advantage. The subsidy 
argument should be unavailing when the counter-speaker is not tied to 
the election.60 
 
It is true that the counter speaker will gain access to an audience that 
the first speaker may have paid a consultant for help with targeting. 
But this is also true in television and radio advertising. The FCC’s 
political file has been facilitating targeting of audiences for many 
decades.61 The targets for TV and radio may be broader than the 
narrow audiences targeted sometimes on social media, but there is 
nothing constitutionally interesting about smaller audiences for 
political speech than larger ones. The proposed regulation would 
simply bring online political ads in line with existing regulations for 
political ads on broadcast television and radio. A decision against 
audience transparency for online political advertisements would call 
into question the constitutionality of the FCC political file, an 
unimaginable result given the longevity and utility of the program. 
 
A similar line of attack could come from the campaign finance 
disclosure jurisprudence. I explain the disclosure jurisprudence more 
deeply in other work,62 so I limit myself to a brief summary here. The 
Court generally upholds campaign finance disclosure regulations on 
the theory that disclosure’s public benefits (reducing corruption or its 
appearance, informing voters, and facilitating enforcement) are great 
enough to tolerate the burdens on political speech that litigants 





60 Groups can hold multiple motivations at once. Some immigrants’ rights groups are 
active in electoral politics, and some are not. My point is that, especially among 
those who are not, the subsidy argument should be unavailing. 
61 According to FCC.gov, the Commission first adopted rules requiring broadcast 
stations to keep a public file more than 40 years ago and certain political 
programming files have been public for nearly 75 years. See Public Inspection Files, 
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov [https://perma.cc/AB9N-JSRK] 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2020).  
62 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 2; see also Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance 
Disclosure, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 11 (2018). 
63 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
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disclose an advertisement’s audiences might say that the requirement 
burdens speech by “chilling” it.64 They may argue that, at the margins, 
political advertisers will make fewer ads or target differently because 
their audiences will be targetable by the other side.  
 
The chilling argument is just the subsidy argument in different 
packaging. Any chilling would not be the result of threats of 
harassment, which is the only chilling that the Court has found 
persuasive in a few as-applied challenges in the past 60 years. The 
chilling that campaigns may complain about here would instead result 
from the first speaker’s perception of reduced efficacy of political 
advertisements due to the increased possibility of being held 
accountable for their speech. The rationale for the chilling exception 
does not go to efficacy of political communication; it goes to 
harassment. 
 
The cornerstone of democracy is the voters’ ability to hold elected 
officials accountable; that ability starts with campaign finance 
transparency prior to the election. It is a clever campaign move to take 
refuge in a regulatory loophole that exists because regulations have not 
caught up to technology. But the loophole does not expand our First 






64 Note that the Court takes for granted that disclosure “chills” speech, but the 
evidence of a “chilling” phenomenon is mixed, at best, and it may be offset by a 
“thawing” phenomenon among those who want to “go on record” for a candidate. 
See Raymond J. La Raja, Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative 
Effect of Transparency on Making Small Campaign Contributions, 36 POL. BEHAV. 
753 (2014); Wood, supra n. 62; Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the 
Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns, 15 
ELECTION L.J. 302 (2016); Abby K. Wood et al., Mind the (Participation) Gap: 
Vouchers, Voting, and Visibility (Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Paper No. CLASS19-9, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3354826; Abby K. 
Wood & Michael D. Gilbert, Disclosure Can Encourage Political Speech, THE HILL 
(Oct. 21, 2016, 9:11 A.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/campaign/302152-
disclosure-can-encourage-political-speech [https://perma.cc/3826-9E6G].  
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The benefits of facilitating counter-speech outweigh any “chilling” 
effect that occurs at the margins.65 First, suppose that disinformation 
does cause primary harm to the “listener,” by encouraging them to 
vote differently than they would if they were fully informed. That is a 
harm that, if repeated enough, can indirectly undermine election 
results.66 Reducing the amount of voter disinformation by increasing 
the probability that counter-speech occurs is a governmental interest 
the court should recognize and take seriously. Disinformation and 
media coverage of disinformation seem to cause a secondary public 
harm by reducing the voters’ confidence in our elections. Government 
action forcing platforms to enable counter-speech should help to 
reduce that damage. 
 
Finally, I have argued here that it is important for the government to 
regulate the platforms, rather than for them to self-regulate. We need a 
uniform system, and regulators are unreliable as self-regulators.67 But 
if the platforms decided to make audiences re-targetable in the absence 
of government action, the First Amendment challenges described 
above would fail for lack of state action. 
 
IV. Comparing Counter-speech Possibilities in TV/Radio and 
Online Settings 
 
Here’s how counter-speech for TV and radio ads works. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) requires disclosure of advertising 
buys for broadcast television and radio advertising. The FCC’s 





65 Abby K. Wood, Show Me the Money: Candidate Selection Based on Campaign 
Finance Transparency (Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Paper No. CLASS17-24, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029095. 
66 I say “indirectly” here with the warnings of Professor Foley in mind. See Edward 
B. Foley, Assessing the Validity of an Election’s Result: History, Theory, and 
Present Threats, NYU L. Rev. Online (forthcoming 2020). Manipulating election 
outcomes directly versus affecting voters’ choices through lies are qualitatively very 
different. As mentioned above, the Court takes very seriously disinformation aimed 
at electoral integrity. See Minn. Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 
n.4 (2018). 
67 Wood & Ravel, supra n. 2 at 1245-48. 
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ads purchased on the stations. Figure 1 shows an example of a political 
file report.  
 
 
Figure 1: Excerpt of FCC Political File data for one station and one 
candidate and one week in 2020.  
 
For the last week of January 2020, Democratic Presidential Candidate 
Mike Bloomberg’s campaign purchased $64,940 in advertising slots 
on WBNS-TV, the CBS affiliate that includes The Ohio State 





68 Bloomberg was the only candidate running ads in that market at the time. 
Interested readers can track advertising on this particular station at Mike Bloomberg 
2020 Political File, WBNS-TV, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/tv-profile/wbns-tv/political-
files/2020/federal/president/82e11558-dbab-2089-11d1-035070be287c/ (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2020). By way of comparison, a much more active market during the same 
week was Des Moines, Iowa, where all candidates for the Democratic presidential 
nomination advertised. The local CBS affiliate for Des Moines, KCCI, had already 
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station, shows which audiences he targeted. In the 8 AM hour, he ran 
two spots to appeal to daily CBS This Morning Viewers. In the 10 AM 
hour, he targeted Let’s Make a Deal viewers with three spots. In the 11 
AM hour, he targeted Price is Right viewers with all three spots.69 
Armed with this information, groups and campaigns who want to 
reach the same audience that Bloomberg reached with these ads knew 
where to find them. As I demonstrate next, this counter-speech is 
currently impossible with political advertising on social media. 
 
a. Counter-speech for Online Paid Political Speech 
 
We start with the good news. Google has facilitated counter-speech for 
online political speech and discloses targeting criteria in its advertising 
archive.70 Using the platform’s downloadable targeting criteria, which 
includes advertisement ID, anyone who wants to speak to the core 
audience of a given ad which was targeted using Google’s in-platform 
tools, has the necessary information to do so. That said, the 
information is not available in a particularly user friendly format. 
While there are pros and cons to Google’s choice to limit targeting 
abilities, the company’s decision to disclose targeting criteria allows 
the court’s preferred remedy to occur: counter-speech, at least to the 
core audience. 
 
Social media is a different story. Under the social media platforms’ 
current approach, it is nearly impossible, and certainly impractical, to 
target the audience that saw any ad. Take, for example, the Facebook 
Ad Archive. Figure 2 shows the Facebook Ad Archive page for an 
 
filed 194 times, for 9 candidates, as of January 24, 2020. Political Files, KCCI, FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/tv-profile/kcci/political-
files/2020/federal/president/dcd2b4da-133b-153c-3c19-0f719cc1dd21/ (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2020).  
69 Mike Bloomberg 2020 Political File, WBNS-TV January 2020 Invoice, FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/tv-profile/wbns-tv/political-
files/2020/federal/president/82e11558-dbab-2089-11d1-035070be287c/ (Click on the 
MIKE BLOOMBERG 2020 folder; then click on the file named “21728”) (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
70 Political Advertising in the United States, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP., 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/region/US (last visited Feb. 22, 
2020). 
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advertisement by “Islamist Watch,” a subgroup of the Middle East 
Forum, a nonprofit 501(c)3 organization that the Southern Poverty 
Legal Center describes as “a think tank . . . known for its academic 
approach to fomenting anti-Muslim sentiment.”71 The Forum paid for 
Representative Paul Gosar to travel to London for a “free speech” rally 
with strong anti-Muslim themes.72 (Remember Gosar’s name, as we 
will return to him when we cover organic content.)  
 
The ad complains that President Trump has not set up a commission 
on “radical Islam” and that “leading Islamist organizations continue to 
enjoy government endorsement and patronage,” with a picture of 
Donald Trump, mouth open. The caption says, “American Islamism 





71 Middle East Forum Bankrolls Violent ‘Free Tommy’ Rally, S. POVERTY L. CTR.: 
HATEWATCH (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/07/11/middle-east-forum-bankrolls-
violent-free-tommy-rally [https://perma.cc/8QSL-JYFP]. 
72 Alex Kotch, Arizona Rep Took $10,000 Trip to Speak at British Anti-Muslim 
Rally, SLUDGE (Aug. 9, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://readsludge.com/2018/08/09/arizona-
rep-took-10000-trip-to-speak-at-british-anti-muslim-rally/ [https://perma.cc/4L2E-
S4ED]. 




Figure 2: Example of paid political speech on Facebook and the data 
the platform provides to the public about the speech. 
 
One can imagine several groups who may want to respond to this ad, 
such as the President or the Council on American-Islamic Relations. 
How can they speak to the same audience? On the right side of the 
Figure is the information that Facebook provides. We see that the ad 
ran for 6 days in January 2020, the group spent less than $100 and 
targeted fewer than 1000 people. The gender breakdown is shown in 
the bar chart. Men above the age of 45 were the primary audience. The 
map shows that the audience was scattered in every state except 
Montana, Colorado, and Vermont. Counter-speech to this audience is 
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impossible without targeting all men over the age of 45 in almost all 
states. Even in the age of “cheap speech,” this would be extremely 
expensive.73 Facebook does not facilitate counter-speech for paid ads, 
and no federal regulation requires them to do so. 
 
b. Counter-speech for Unpaid Organic Content 
 
No social media platform has an archive of organic content, which 
makes sense because it would be a herculean task, requiring an archive 
of almost the entire platform. However, the platforms could at least 
archive the organic content created by or circulated by public officials 
and politically-oriented Pages, or those in which they are tagged. 
Then, if a campaign or group wanted to counter-speak to an audience 
who viewed organic content, the platforms could facilitate that speech.  
 
Take, for example, the organic content circulated on Twitter by Rep. 
Gosar, depicted in Figure 3. It is a photoshopped image of President 
Obama with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and it says, “[t]he 
world is a better place without these guys in power.” This is a fake 
image; whoever made it altered a photograph of President Obama with 







73 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (To 
American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200 (2017); Eugene Volokh, 
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995). 




Figure 3: Photoshopped image of President Obama and Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani was photoshopped into the image, 




If someone wants to counter-speak against this image, how can they 
reach the same audience? As of this writing, Rep. Gosar’s tweet has 
been favorited 22,200 times and retweeted 6,500 times. Thousands of 
people commented on it, as well. This means that all of the followers 
of all of the people engaging with it by commenting, favoriting, or 
retweeting, also may have seen the image. Only Twitter knows who 
saw the image on its platform. If President Obama, President Rouhani, 
Prime Minister Singh, or even a group of “Photoshoppers for 
Democracy” wanted to counter-speak to the same audience, they could 
not. At best, commenting on the post is a chance to counter-speak, but 
the comment only goes to followers of the person commenting and 
anyone scrolling through the comments of the photo after a person 





74 Philip Bump, How to spot a Photoshopped image, or, The Problem with the 
Internet, WASHINGTON POST, (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/07/how-spot-photoshopped-
image-or-problem-with-internet/. 
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successfully counter-speak to the same, or even close to the same, 
audience.  
 
a. Counter-speech for Paid Organic Content 
 
Michael Bloomberg’s campaign adopted a sponsored content approach 
to political ads on social media.75 Figure 4 shows an example of 
sponsored content (a meme) paid for by the Bloomberg campaign, as 





























75 See Taylor Lorenz, Michael Bloomberg’s Campaign Suddenly Drops Memes 
Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/style/michael-bloomberg-memes-jerry-
media.html [https://perma.cc/27KH-5PYQ]. 




Facebook reversed its position banning paid content of this type for 
political ads, but it currently does not plan to put the ads in the 
Facebook Ad Archive.76 This move opens up the possibility that 
millions upon millions of paid ads and impressions will not be 
captured in the Archive, meaning that campaigns paying “influencers” 
to post ads for them will not be held accountable to the same audience 
that views the content. Counter-speech will be impossible. 
 
V. A Proposal to Facilitate Counter-Speech 
 
Facilitating counter-speech by making the audiences of online political 
speech available will improve transparency and accountability. It 
should also marginally reduce incentives to spread disinformation, 
even where the ultimate source of the money is foreign and 
meddlesome.  
 
Regulators should design rules that make counter-speech possible in 
response to all political speech and not only in response to 
disinformation. This approach avoids sticky administrability concerns 
that would put platforms, regulators, or courts in the undesirable 
position of “Truth Arbiter.” 
 
In prior work, I have urged that revealing targeting criteria may suffice 
to allow counter-speech. I now believe that proposal was too modest, 
as it did not address the full effects of disinformation. Instead, two 
audiences must be made available. First, the initial targets of the 
message—the “core audience”—should be made retargetable, as we 
argued previously. Secondly, everyone who saw the paid 
communication in their social media feed—the “final audience”—







76 See Nancy Scola, Bloomberg’s Meme Spree Prompts Changes in Facebook, 
Instagram Rules, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2020, 4:58 P.M.), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/14/bloomberg-meme-changes-facebook-
instagram-115333 [https://perma.cc/B7RR-NBNU]. 
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Importantly, this proposal does not require campaigns to reveal their 
targeting strategies. It only requires making the same audiences – 
either the core audience or the final audience – available. The 
campaign doing the re-targeting need not even know the identity of the 
targets. The platform can assign all core and final audiences an 
audience identification number to share with advertisers who request 
to speak to the same audience.  
 
The government should not require platforms to allow microtargeting 
within the core or final audiences. If speaker B wants to speak to only 
suburban women within the audience targeted by speaker A, the 
platforms may choose to make that subgroup available, consistent with 
the requirements of privacy regulators and their profit motives. 
However, the government should not require that further targeting be 
permitted, because it needs a well-tailored regulation to fit an 
important government interest. Here, the government’s interest – 
allowing counter-speech generally, but especially to combat 
disinformation – is best addressed by making the entire audience (core 
or final) available. To the extent that disinformation causes harm to the 
audience, the regulation should be tailored to reduce the harm to all 
who saw the ad. This means the best strategy for surviving judicial 
review is to prohibit further microtargeting within the core or final 
audiences. Still, at a minimum, the government should not require that 
the platforms allow microtargeting within core or final audiences. 
 
Of course, there are policy-related objections to my proposal.77 First, 
there is the possibility that campaigns will not actually avail 
themselves of the tools, because they actually do not want to speak to 
the same audiences. The argument goes: polarization among voters has 
become so extreme that candidates no longer even attempt to persuade 
moderate voters, meaning they no longer target the same mass of 
voters in the political center. Instead, candidates try to spur on their 
own base to turn out in mobilization campaigns. Even if this were true 
in the general election context – and the amount of advertising that still 
occurs on network television argues against this being universally true 





77 I respond to legal objections in Part III, supra. 
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primaries. Therefore, it’s likely that at least some campaigns would 
avail themselves of the opportunity to speak to the same audience 
targeted by their political rivals.  
 
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the tool is used frequently or not for 
one simple reason: the public is deeply concerned about political 
disinformation.78 Improving the transparency of political speech online 
can help to assuage a concerned public.79 
 
Social media platforms may also protest the proposal on the ground 
that it would interfere with user privacy. However, the proposal is very 
similar to the Custom Audiences tool that Facebook already has 
allowed campaigns and groups to use in order to target millions of 
Americans. Privacy arguments—especially in the United States, where 






78 See Nic Newman, Executive Summary and Key Findings of the 2019 Digital News 
Report, REUTERS INST: DIGITAL NEWS REP., 
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2019/overview-key-findings-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/L2KX-RFHK] (finding that public concern about misinformation 
and disinformation remains high, reaching a 55% average across 38 countries and 
67% in the United States, despite efforts by platforms and publishers to build public 
confidence). As Shannon McGregor recently explained, “there is the POSSIBILITY 
of propaganda being effective, given the conditions of the current media 
environment. We don’t need to prove the town is burning to advocate for a fire 
station. A town CAN burn; therefore, we should have a [public] fire station.” 
Shannon McGregor (@shannimcg), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2020, 12:42 PM), 
https://twitter.com/shannimcg/status/1229507302387924992 
[https://perma.cc/MUR6-BEUU] (explaining McGregor’s argument in her recent 
Washington Post article); see Shannon C. McGregor & Dannagal G. Young, Mass 
Propaganda Used to Be Difficult, but Facebook Made It Easy, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/02/14/mass-propaganda-
used-be-difficult-facebook-made-it-easy/ [https://perma.cc/UVK3-THXA]. 
79 See Newman, supra note 78; Eric Tucker & Emily Swanson, AP-NORC Poll: 
Majority Worry About 2020 Foreign Meddling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 19, 2010), 
https://apnews.com/ac56e80c296a49e593104d6575a18ce2 [https://perma.cc/HZ5B-
ZD5E] (“63% of Americans have major concerns about at least one of those types of 
foreign election interference . . . Those include the spread of disinformation online to 
sow divisions among American voters . . . ”).  
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Moving on to implementation details, ideally, the government should 
implement this proposal rather than the platforms. Additionally, the 
fact that platforms profit from the political disinformation they host 
lends political heft to any government disclosure policies around 
political speech on their platforms. Of course, the platforms are paid 
directly to run paid ads. When it comes to unpaid organic content, the 
platforms do not profit directly (they are not paid to post or promote), 
but they do profit indirectly. All content, paid and organic, brings in 
more users. For platforms, “users” equals “advertising audience,” so 
platforms can charge more for each ad that is placed as their audiences 
grow due to organic content on the platforms. Moreover, as best we 
can tell, a lot of the disinformation that circulated in 2016 was 
comprised of retweeted and shared memes and dis-informative “fake 
news” from newspapers that did not actually exist. To the extent that 
disinformation causes harm, the Court could agree that counter-speech 
is an appropriate remedy, whether or not the platform was paid directly 
for the placement. 
 
The existence of payments of any sort, even if offline, provides a 
nexus for the government to propose a regulation of organic content, 
though it may be almost impossible to administer a program that 
regulates organic content beyond that posted by groups already in their 
existing political ad database. Take, for example, Rep. Gosar’s tweet. 
If the tweet were disseminated by bots, or if someone was paid for the 
photoshopping, campaign financing would be involved. However, off-
platform payments may be difficult to detect, especially considering 
the vagueness of many campaigns’ expenditure filings.  
 
In the absence of government regulation, platforms should still 
consider self-regulation. Platforms have a profit incentive to offer 
campaigns and groups the ability to target people who saw a given ad 
or post. This applies to paid and organic content. Platforms already 
allow people to be targeted based on their demographics, who they 
follow, pages they like and other data. Why not also sell the 
opportunity to target us based on posts in our feed? And, as mentioned 
above, this type of transparency should help to reduce panic among the 
population, helping platforms’ public relations and therefore bottom 
line. 





Accountability for paid online political speech is lacking. Narrow 
targeting and competing campaigns’ inability to counter-speak to each 
others’ audiences have created a situation in which political speakers 
spreading disinformation do so without much fear of accountability. 
This accountability gap is remarkable, especially considering that 
counter-speech is possible under FCC regulations when ads are run on 
television and radio, rather than posted online.  
 
Government can constitutionally demand transparency, as it has in the 
television and radio context. In this essay, I have shown concrete 
examples of how counter-speech is possible in the broadcast context 
and impossible on Facebook, despite its modest attempts to self-
regulate. With or without government requirements to do so, platforms 
should publicly disclose, and make available, both the targets (core 
audience) and audience who saw the ad due to shares and likes (final 
audience). Counter-speakers do not need individually identifying 
information, which is not available in the broadcast context, either. 
They just need access to the same audiences. 
 
In summary, counter-speech facilitates accountability, which is crucial 
in a democracy. Government regulators and platforms should facilitate 
counter-speech. At minimum, online advertisements should be subject 
to the same regulatory and disclosure requirements as other types of 
advertisements, such as those broadcasted on TV or radio. 
 
